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RISK AND RESILIENCE IN HEALTH DATA
INFRASTRUCTURE
W. NICHOLSON PRICE II, PHD *
Today’s health system runs on data. However, for a system that
generates and requires so much data, the health care system is surprisingly
bad at maintaining, connecting, and using those data. In the easy cases of
coordinated care and stationary patients, the system works—sometimes. But
when care is fragmented, fragmented data often result.
Fragmented data create risks both to individual patients and to the
system. For patients, fragmentation creates risks in care based on incomplete
or incorrect information, and may also lead to privacy risks from a patchedtogether system. For the system, data fragmentation hinders efforts to
improve efficiency and quality, and to drive health innovation based on
collected data.
Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit by considering the
idea of health data infrastructure. Most obviously, that would be
infrastructure for health data—that is, infrastructure on which health data
can be stored and transmitted. But it should also be an infrastructure of
health data—that is, a platform of shared data on which to base further
efforts to increase the efficiency or quality of care.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s health system runs on data. Patients and doctors
complain about the proportion of time during a patient appointment
that is spent entering data into the doctor’s computer, but this has
become the new normal. Data have the potential to help improve care
for individual patients, to increase the efficiency of the system as a
whole, and to provide the basis for future innovation in care.1
However, for a system that generates and requires so much data,
the health care system is surprisingly bad at maintaining, connecting,
and using those data. In the easy cases, it works. If a patient stays
with the same primary care physician, coordinates all care through
that physician, goes to the same pharmacy, the same hospital, and the
same labs, and uses the same insurer, that patient’s records may—
may—be integrated into a single comprehensive medical record that
tracks the patient’s health over time.2 But patients don’t behave like
this most of the time. Patients move between providers, pick up
drugs while traveling, switch insurers as they change jobs (or lose
them), see different specialists, and generally vary the parameters of
their care. And the health data system does a poor job accounting for
this fragmentation of care, resulting in fragmented data.3
Fragmented data create risks to patients and to the system as a
whole. At the patient level, fragmentation creates risks in care, where
information necessary for effective care is either not available or
incorrect. Fragmentation also creates risks for patient privacy, as a
result of the needs to haphazardly share data across different health
actors.4 At the systemic level, data fragmentation hinders efforts to
make the system more efficient as a whole, because putative
optimizers only see a fragment of the picture. It also slows innovation
in health, especially big-data driven modern initiatives that rely on
large, high-quality datasets for their power and accuracy.5
1. See infra Section I.A.
2. Integrated records also exist when the provision of care is itself integrated rather

than fragmented; an integrated care provider of care such as Kaiser Permanente can
maintain integrated health records because that one entity provides all aspects of patient
care and payment. See infra Section I.B.1. Even for integrated providers, however, patient
records may be fragmented when patients shift between providers over time.
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See id.
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Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit from
looking at health data through an infrastructure lens. I draw on Brett
Frischmann’s extensive analysis of infrastructure, which he
characterizes as largely nonrivalrous resources that derive value
principally from their many downstream uses.6 Most obviously,
health data infrastructure would be infrastructure for health data—
that is, infrastructure on which health data can be stored and
transmitted (such as computer systems, shared data standards, and
the like). But it should also be infrastructure of health data—that is, a
platform of shared data on which to base further efforts to increase
the efficiency or quality of care. In an infrastructure of data, the data
themselves are a resource to enable productive downstream activity
that can improve the health care system.
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the landscape
of health data today, including potential benefits of the collection and
analysis of health data and the reasons for fragmentation that limits
those benefits. Part II describes the risks that arise from a fragmented
health data system. To be clear: this brief essay does not attempt to
completely catalog all risks that arise from the use of data in health
care; it focuses instead on a subset of particularly salient risks that
arise specifically from the problem of fragmentation.7 Part III
sketches the basics of an infrastructure vision for and of health data.
I.

HEALTH DATA TODAY

The health system generates a blizzard of data at an increasing
rate. From the paper records of prior practice, providers have largely
moved to use electronic health records (also called electronic medical
records).8 New forms of data are proliferating to fill those records,
including the reports of traditional medical encounters, high-volume

6. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 61 (2012) (describing the three key characteristics of infrastructural resources as
nonrivalrous consumption, value derived from input into downstream uses, and the ability
to be an input for a wide range of such downstream uses).
7. To take the easiest example, the underlying data may be inaccurate, whether due
to errors collecting or entering the data, or may be systematically biased. See, e.g., Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical Databases, 41
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2013). If underlying data are inaccurate, joining them into easy-touse centralized databases will not solve that inaccuracy (though the possibility of crosschecking might ameliorate the problem).
8. The move to electronic health records was not accidental. A substantial sum was
made available for providers to shift to electronic records. HITECH Act, passed as part of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, div. A, tit. XIII, div. b, tit.
IV, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). See SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH
RECORDS & MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY 38–40 (2016). As a powerful counterpart,
penalties are imposed on entities failing to shift to and meaningfully use electronic records
by established deadlines. See id. at 41–42; Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program
Basics, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/basics.html
[https://perma.cc/7DFK-AHW7]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
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diagnostic tests, such as genetic sequencing and analysis, prescription
records, and others.9
A.

Potential Benefits

These data can create substantial benefits for patients, providers,
and for the health system as a whole.10 Ideally, they should lead to
improved care for individual patients as integrated medical records
prevent easily avoidable medical errors and allow a broader picture
of the patient’s overall health.11 They should enable more efficient
care by reducing the costs of coordination, should decrease costs, and
should even enable more effective and efficient billing for health
treatments. On a slightly more systemic level, many health care
reforms rely on the ability to measure care precisely—for instance, to
observe whether patients are treated according to approved
procedures or are readmitted to hospitals too frequently.12 Health
data enable the imposition of sanctions or the provision of incentives
to try to shape health care in productive ways.13
Data can also enable us to draw more nuanced and useful
information from the health system. Insurers and others have used
information about actual patient experience in the health system to
demonstrate that certain drugs are less safe than expected,14 that
some treatments may be more cost-effective at providing the same
benefit,15 that some patients gain more benefit from a particular
treatment than others,16 or that a drug should be moved from
prescription-only to over-the-counter status.17 Recently, the FDA has
even gained the statutory authority to use this type of real-world
evidence to approve new indications for drugs.18 More broadly,
9. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Health Innovation on
the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017).
10. These multiple uses do not mean that doctors or others collect the data with those
purposes in mind; data may be collected just to monitor care, or for the purposes of billing,
or for many potential reasons. But once data are collected, they can be used in many
different ways.
11. See, e.g., James R. Broughman & Ronald C. Chen, Using Big Data for Quality
Assessment in Oncology, 5 J. COMP. EFF. RES. 309 (2016).
12. See id.
13. See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-10, 129 Stat. 87, § 102 (requiring a plan to develop data-based measures for physician
and hospital performance), § 101 (creating payment incentive structures using those
measures).
14. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing the identification of toxic side
effects of the painkiller Vioxx by Kaiser Permanente, which analyzed patient records in its
integrated health system and found higher rates of heart attacks among patients taking
Vioxx than among patients taking other similar drugs).
15. See id. at 16–18 (describing cost-effectiveness research and the use of observational
studies of patient data to perform such research).
16. See id. (describing comparative-effectiveness research).
17. Id. at 7–10 (describing a petition filed by Blue Cross of California (later Wellpoint)
to take certain antihistamines, including Claritin, over-the-counter).
18. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (2016) (requiring FDA to
“establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” for the approval
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health data can potentially lead to advances in precision medicine.
Precision medicine, the scientific tailoring of medical treatment to
reflect individual patient variation, requires knowing how different
patients respond to different forms of treatment.19 Some of this
knowledge can be generated by classical hypothesis-driven scientific
and clinical studies, but other advances, including those relying on
machine-learning and other forms of data mining, rely on large sets
of existing health data.20
Overall, health data offer substantial promise for improving
health care, in terms of both near-term, patient-specific benefits, and
later innovations to improve the health system. Unfortunately, these
benefits have been slow to materialize. One cause of this slowness is
the fragmentation of health data.21
B.

Fragmentation

Why are health data today so fragmented? There are at least
three linked reasons. First, and most obviously, care itself is
fragmented. Second, and related, competition between entities in the
health system reduces incentives to connect and link data. Third, and
finally, legal barriers to information sharing, especially the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), make it hard
to link data.
1.

Fragmented Care

The key underlying cause of health data fragmentation is that
health care is itself frequently fragmented.22 Patients see different
of new indications for an already-approved drug or to fulfill post-approval study or
surveillance requirements). This provision has been the subject of considerable criticism.
See, e.g., Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act — Will It Take Us
Back in Time?, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2473 (2015).
19. Laura K. Wiley et al., Harnessing Next-Generation Informatics for Personalizing
Medicine: A Report from AMIA’s 2014 Health Policy Invitational Meeting, 23 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 413 (2016); Marc L Berger et al., Opportunities and Challenges in
Leveraging Electronic Health Record Data in Oncology, 12 FUTURE ONCOL. 1261 (2016).
20. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 419, 429–34,
437–39 (2015) (describing the big data potential and requirements of next-generation blackbox medicine).
21. The fragmentation of health data is certainly not the only cause for the delay in
realizing benefits of health data innovation. Some actors lack the right incentives to actively
move toward the highest-quality, most efficient care. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Price, supra note
9, at 9–10, 27–28 (discussing the problematic incentives for drug manufacturers and health
insurers, respectively); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial
Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996) (discussing the incentives of doctors
to provide more care than necessary). Technological hurdles also play a role. See Eisenberg
& Price, supra note 9, at 23–26. And even once innovative information is generated, getting
health care providers to implement the new knowledge can be challenging. Id. at 28–32.
22. See, e.g., Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely
Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2008) (noting popular wisdom that the American health
care system is exceptionally fragmented). There are exceptions, including integrated health
systems such as Kaiser Permanente, Geisinger, or the federally-run Indian Health Service
and Veterans Administration.
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doctors at different times, visit different drugstores, change insurers,
and in other ways participate in an inherently fragmented health
system.23 Hospitals, doctors, insurers, and pharmacies all keep their
own records. These records are generated for different purposes and
may use different terms or code different information.24 For instance,
insurance claims records are principally generated for the purpose of
payment; accordingly, they lack some forms of care data and may
potentially be skewed.25 The relevant information about patient care
is thus spread among different actors in the health care system, in
different forms.
Health data are not only generated in the course of health care.
Research companies like 23andMe collect substantial health
information,26 but are not involved in care and keep their data
separate—potentially to be used for later commercial research. Noncare entities, like Fitbit (whose activity trackers monitor physical
activity),27 Apple (which aims to create a personal digital hub of
health information),28 or others, also generate health data—but they
are, of course, largely separate from the system of health and hold
different data in different places as well. Overall, different entities
both within and outside the health care system generate data
separately, which are then held in different siloes. This might not be
so problematic if communication and data-sharing between the siloes
were easy and seamless. Unfortunately, it isn’t.
2.

Data Competition

Even for parallel entities, like multiple doctors that a patient
may see, competition also keeps data fragmented. Theoretically,
among care providers, competition should be irrelevant; the duty of
care to patients should preclude competitive hoarding of data or
refusal to share data. But no such pressure exists for the providers of

23.
24.
25.
26.

See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 28–32.
Id.
Id. at Section I.D.
Antonio Regalado, 23andMe Sells Data for Drug Search, MIT TECH. REV. (June 21,
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601506/23andme-sells-data-for-drug-search/
[https://perma.cc/F892-3PRU] (describing 23andMe’s collection of data and its sales of data
subsets to over a dozen drug companies, including to Genentech for $10 million to search
for Parkinson’s drugs).
27. Other sports companies are getting into the health data game. For instance, Nike
recently signed a multimillion-dollar deal to collect and analyze performance data collected
from athletes at the University of Michigan. Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals, New
Player Data Is Up for Grabs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearable-technology-nike-privacy-college-football.html
[https://perma.cc/5XEW-7273].
28. See A Bold New Way to Look at Your Health, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
ios/health/ [https://perma.cc/QV4M-KVEW] (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (describing the iOS
Health App, which collects phone data and can serve as a repository for personal medical
records).
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diagnostic tests, for instance, or among others that collect health or
health-related data.29
In addition to competition among those who generate data,
there is competition among the vendors who provide ways of
generating and managing data. The electronic health record market is
itself fragmented, with hundreds of vendors.30 This itself could
organically lead to fragmentation through lack of interoperability, as
different vendors develop and sell different systems that might
happen not to work with each other. However, there is evidence that
electronic health record vendors do more, deliberately designing
systems that are mutually incompatible to lock customers in and
prevent easy migration between systems.31 This lack of
interoperability obviously hinders consolidation of data, transfers
between providers as patients move, and the integration of care.
3.

Legal Barriers

A third barrier to integrating health data comes from legal
barriers to data-sharing, especially the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, commonly known as HIPAA.32 The HIPAA
Privacy Rule places limits on how personally identifiable health data
may be used and disclosed.33 In general, all uses and disclosures of
such information by covered entities—providers, insurers, and health

29. Perhaps the most well-documented such proprietary data silo is that held by
Myriad Genetics, which amassed a dataset of information about women tested for
mutations in the breast-cancer-related BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes while it held patents on
those genes. See, e.g., Misha Angrist & Robert Cook-Deegan, Distributing the Future: The
Weak Justifications for Keeping Human Genomic Databases Secret and the Challenges and
Opportunities in Reverse Engineering Them, 3 APPL. TRANSL. GENOMICS 124 (2014) (describing
Myriad’s dataset and others like it); Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized
Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233 (2015) (describing how patents led to Myriad’s
competitive advantage).
30. See OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., Hospital Health IT
Developers (July 2017), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-ofEHRs-to-Participating-Hospitals.php [https://perma.cc/P2YC-T9J9]. The top six vendors
provide services for 92% of all nonfederal acute-care hospitals. Id.
31. See OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., REPORT TO CONGRESS:
REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 11–19 (Apr. 2015), available at
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8K8M-6E3X] (defining “information blocking” as “when persons or entities
knowingly and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information”
and providing evidence of such practices).
32. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat.
2548 (1996).
33. HIPAA’s principal data restrictions come from the Privacy Rule, codified at 45
C.F.R. § 160 (2016). HIPAA’s regulatory structure is complex and need not be discussed in
full here; for additional information, see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule (May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SBU-JX9R] (providing
HIPAA
overview); Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 32–35 (discussing the Privacy Rule in the
context of research using existing health data).
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data clearinghouses34—are prohibited unless specifically permitted.
To be sure, some permissions are quite broad, such as the use or
disclosure of information for the purpose of “health care operations.”
Theoretically, this should make it easy to share information related to
patient care. But HIPAA still creates substantial informal barriers;
providers and insurers are notorious for invoking HIPAA as a
blanket excuse for refusing to share information, including for uses
that are expressly permitted.35 As Arti Rai describes it, “compliance
with the Common Rule [governing research on human subjects] and
the HIPAA Privacy Rule imposes a tax on sharing data.”36
HIPAA creates more substantial and formal barriers to sharing
information for secondary research purposes. Research is expressly
not a permitted purpose for use or disclosure of protected health
information.37 As a result, secondary research often involves health
information that has been de-identified, which takes it out of
HIPAA’s ambit.38 However, as I have discussed elsewhere, deidentification can increase the fragmentation of health data, because
reassembling data about a patient from different sources becomes
substantially more difficult—deliberately so—without identifying
information.39 Finally, HIPAA creates barriers between different
types of entities that assemble or create health data. HIPAA governs
only “covered entities” that are directly involved in the health
system.40 But increasingly, relevant health information is held by
entities outside that system, such as 23andMe, Fitbit, Apple, or

34. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Uses or disclosures by the business associates of covered
entities are governed, though by contract rather than directly under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.
45 C.F.R. § 152(a)(3).
35. For examples of refusals to share information, see, e.g., Paula Span, Hipaa’s Use as
Code of Silence Often Misinterprets the Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/health/hipaas-use-as-code-of-silence-oftenmisinterprets-the-law.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/L8UG-TRTF].
36. Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical
Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641, 1652 (2017) (noting in addition, “At least for some
kinds of data, this tax can be relatively modest.”).
37. 21 C.F.R. § 164.501. Notably, an initial version of the 21st Century CURES Act
included a provision adding research as a permissible purpose for use or, directing the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to “revise or clarify” the Privacy Rule so that
research “including studies whose purpose is to obtain generalizable knowledge” is
included as part of the exception for health care operations. See 21st Century Cures Act,
H.R. 6, 114th Cong. § 1124 (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/114/
bills/hr6/BILLS-114hr6ih.xml [https://perma.cc/V92W-WGDY]. As passed, the legislation
calls instead for the study of such an amendment to the Privacy Rule. 21st Century Cures
Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 2063 (2016).
38. HIPAA governs only personally identifiable health information; a safe harbor
exempts any information from which 17 pieces of identifying information have been
removed.
39. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401, 1413 (2016); see also Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health
Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 252–53 (2013) (noting
the problem of interoperability for health records).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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others.41 None of these entities, or the data they hold, are directly
governed by HIPAA.42 On the one hand, this might seem to improve
the problem of data fragmentation; these entities can gather data
unhindered by HIPAA’s strictures. On the other hand, fragmentation
may increase because different entities, with different forms of health
data, are governed by different legal regimes.43
Notably, there have also been governmental efforts to encourage
interoperability between different health data systems. The Office of
the National Coordinator has set out a goal of electronic health record
interoperability by 2021 to 2024.44 And, of course, the push toward
electronic health records was itself a federal initiative.45 Other private
systems have been created with the goal of collecting data across
providers in order to ensure continuous care and ease the processing
of claims; however, these efforts have met with real challenges.46
Overall, health data in the U.S. health care system remain highly
fragmented among different entities, working with different and
often mutually incompatible health records systems.

41. “Covered entities” governed by HIPAA include health plans, health information
clearinghouses, and health-care providers who transmit certain information electronically.
Id. Entities like 23andMe, Fitbit, and Apple fit into none of these categories.
42. If these entities are business associates of covered entities, they may be regulated
by HIPAA as described in note 34, supra.
43. This disparity also raises separate concerns about the fragmentation of governance
of different health data sources and types. See Nicolas Terry, Regulatory Disruption and
Arbitrage in Healthcare Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS (forthcoming
2017).
44. OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., CONNECTING HEALTH AND
CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO ACHIEVE AN INTEROPERABLE HEALTH IT
INFRASTRUCTURE (2014), available at http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC10year
InteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FEF-KDXH] [hereinafter ONC,
INTEROPERABILITY 10-YEAR VISION]; OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH.,
CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A SHARED NATIONWIDE
INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP (Draft Version 1.0 April 2015), available at http://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-draft-version1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9J8-KEAX] [hereinafter ONC, INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP]; see
also Abbott, supra note 39, at 252–53 (noting the efforts of the Office of the National
Coordinator in attempting to combat interoperability and fragmentation challenges).
45. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115,
186, 231 (2009).
46. For instance, a group of large insurers in California created Cal INDEX, a health
information exchange with the goal of automatically collecting and linking patient data
from many providers. See CAL INDEX, New California Not-for-Profit to Operate Statewide,
Next-Generation Health Information Exchange (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.stjhs.org/
documents/HIE/CalINDEX_news-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QG9-NV3L] (“Cal INDEX
will securely collect and integrate clinical data from providers and claims data from payers
to create comprehensive, retrievable patient-centered records known as longitudinal
patient records (LPRs)”). The effort has met with limited success thus far. See Beth Kutcher,
Insurers build broad data exchange in California, but providers are slow to join, MOD .
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160305/
MAGAZINE/303059948 [https://perma.cc/KAZ4-VV9R].
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RISKS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The risks from fragmentation in the health data system are
substantial.47 These risks come in two main buckets: primary risks,
which is to say risks to patients seeking care in the health system,
including problems in the quality of patient care and problems for
patient privacy; and secondary risks, which is to say risks that arise
when health data are repurposed and used to innovate or improve
the system. These categories mirror the concept of primary use of
data for patient care and secondary use of data for other purposes.48
A.

Primary Risks

Primary risks from health data fragmentation include both risks
to patient health and risks to patient privacy. The risks that arise in
patient care mirror the potential benefits of electronic health records
(EHRs). If doctors expect patient information to be present in a
patient’s files—to indicate, for example, the presence of an allergy or
a drug with potential negative interactions—doctors may be less
likely to seek out or independently confirm that information. This
works fine if the information is actually present, but decreases the
likelihood of catching an error when the information is missing due
to fragmentation or otherwise. Such errors can arise from the
transitional and fragmented status of such records, where the
promise of comprehensive information is provided by EHRs but that
promise is not yet realized. This is not to suggest that the previous,
paper-based system was impervious to error—far from it—but rather
to identify a potential source of error in the current fragmented
system.49
Similarly, to the extent that failures of interoperability and
mistakes from assembling fragmented data introduce active errors in
the system, this creates the chance for medical errors which can result
in real harm to the patient. If, for instance, a medical administrator
receives the records from a previous physician by fax and then adds
them by hand to a patient’s current record, he might accidentally
introduce errors that can compromise future care.50 This risk is quite
familiar, as it arises from fragmented data whether paper-based or
electronic.

47. As noted above, other risks exist in the health data system, but are not the focus of
this brief essay. See supra note 7.
48. See OECD, STRENGTHENING HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR HEALTH
CARE QUALITY GOVERNANCE: GOOD PRACTICES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND DATA PRIVACY
PROTECTION CHALLENGES 22 (2013) [hereinafter OECD, HEALTH INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE].
49. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (noting the problems of medical error in the health system).
50. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is
Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 497 (2013).
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Lastly, when health data aren’t meaningfully collected or linked
together, we lose the opportunity to experience better, data-driven
care than what we now receive. This isn’t a classic “risk,” but it does
result in costs to patients measured in foregone benefits. To take a
simple example, suppose that, as part of a research study, a young
woman has her genome sequenced;51 further, suppose that, although
this woman not in a high-risk demographic group, she is in fact
positive for an allele of the BRCA1 gene that substantially increases
her risk of breast cancer. The researcher may not provide her with
this information,52 and there is a substantial likelihood that her
genome sequence may be totally separate from her medical records
used for primary care. Thus, the patient may not be more rigorously
screened for breast cancer, as she would be if had been identified (by
that doctor or another involved in her direct care) as a woman with a
deleterious BRCA1 allele. In one sense, no new risk has been
introduced—but in another, an opportunity for improved care has
been missed.
The currently fragmented health data system also creates risks to
patient privacy. Patient health data are considered by many to be
especially sensitive, meaning that disclosure of such information is an
especially substantial privacy concern.53 Different actors in the system
store information in different ways, leading both to less-secure
implementations (in, for instance, the office of the solo practitioner
that needs to duplicate and keep unnecessary information because it
is not available from labs, insurers, or specialists directly), and to
potential vulnerabilities during information-sharing, when that
occurs. Perhaps more importantly, the clunkiness of the system leads
to workarounds and kludges that pose inherent security risks. For
51. For the sake of the example, let us assume the lab is certified under the 1967
Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments (CLIA), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 263(a), and that the genetic sequencing is thus of high-enough quality to guide clinical
care.
52. A substantial literature considers the question of returning results from genetic
research, which involves questions of patient preference, the clinical validity and utility of
research findings, the nature of the researcher-patient relationship, the question of
informed consent, privacy concerns for patients and family about testing for inheritable
disease susceptibility, and other challenges. This essay does not address these many issues,
instead using the case of genetic testing as an example of a benefit foregone because of data
fragmentation. For an introduction to issues in returning results from genetic testing, see
Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing
Researchers’ Duties, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 361 (2008) (surveying the field); see also Ellen
Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research,
14 GENETICS MED. 473 (2012) (noting legal risks); R. C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations
for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS
MED. 565 (2013) (recommending that a set of identified mutations always be returned to
patients); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in
Genomic Research, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22 (2014) (noting different models of returning
data and different possibilities for informed consent).
53. See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box
Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing the privacy concerns
related to patient health information); Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of
Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012).
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instance, problems with interoperability (and potentially with
HIPAA) may be related to the otherwise-baffling persistence of faxed
requests for information between different providers—faxes, after all,
transmit data as simple images, a lowest-common-denominator
format. Hand-answered, unvalidated, and difficult-to-audit fax
requests suffer by comparison with high-security, auditable
electronic data transfers, but remain the transfer mechanism of choice
for some.54
B.

Secondary Risks

The secondary risks from fragmented data come from efforts to
use those data for future innovation.55 Such efforts include the FDA’s
Sentinel initiative to monitor drug usage for safety risks,56
observational studies to drive care (which can potentially be used to
approve new drug indications under the 21st Century Cures Act57),
machine-learning efforts to discover new biological relationships,58
and implementations of a learning health care system generally.59 All
of these secondary uses of health care data require that data be high
quality and function much better without substantial gaps in data
from different sources or time periods. Fragmentation and errors in
health data hinder these efforts. If they don’t happen, that is one
cost—the foregone benefit of innovation lost. But other risks
materialize when innovation relies on incomplete or faulty data. To
the extent that new care innovations are based on bad data, they may
incorporate errors, biases, or other problems.60 A fundamental data
mining principle is “garbage in, garbage out;” when health care
fragmentation creates inaccuracies in data later used in innovation—
in addition to any inaccuracies that might have existed before—that
innovation suffers, and so may future patients.
54. For instance, the University of Michigan Health System’s request for records from
another doctor—which itself must be filled out by the patient for each other provider, since
no centralized system exists—offers options only for mailing, phoning, or faxing to request
records from another provider, and provides only contact information to receive
information through those means of communication. See U. OF MICH. HOSPS. & HEALTH
CTRS, REQUEST FOR OUTSIDE RECORDS – PATIENT INFORMATION FROM ANOTHER
ORGANIZATION (2013), available at http://www.med.umich.edu/him/release-from-otherorganizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2DE-XUGB].
55. See generally Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9 (describing potential innovation by
health care payers using existing health data).
56. Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing Principles of the Food
and Drug Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &. DRUG
SAFETY 12 (2012).
57. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (requiring the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to “[E]stablish a program to evaluate the potential use of real
world evidence . . . to help support the approval of a new indication for a drug . . . .”).
58. See Price, supra note 20.
59. See, e.g., Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1163
(2014).
60. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 7.
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III. BENEFITS OF RESILIENT HEALTH DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
The risks of fragmented and insecure health data may be at least
partially addressed by considering the system in terms of
infrastructure. The continued fragmentation of health data, where
each health system actor is responsible for generating, collecting, and
storing the data for its own interactions with patients, suggests that
the system needs intervention to avoid ongoing risks. Given the
potential benefits of integrated patient data, effort must be expended
at a systemic level to create infrastructure for the sharing, integration,
and storage of patient data. This effort need not take any one specific
form, but the idea of health data infrastructure, and the risks of
fragmented health data, suggest some features of the desired state.
This Part briefly describes infrastructural resources, relying on a
theoretical framework elaborated by Brett Frischmann.61 It then
identifies how health data fit into an infrastructure model, both
infrastructure for health data, and infrastructure of health data.
Finally, it addresses the implications of an infrastructure model for
policy interventions regarding health data.
A.

Infrastructural Resources

Frischmann has described infrastructure resources as having
three principal characteristics. First, an infrastructural resource “may
be consumed nonrivalrously for some appreciable range of
demand;”62 that is to say, consumption by one does not decrease the
opportunity for consumption by another (within some range beyond
which congestion may decrease the resource’s usability). This allows
“widespread, shared access and productive use of the good,” and
characterizes it as a pure or impure public good.63 Second, “[s]ocial
demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream
productive activities that require the resource as an input.”64 Roads
are not valuable principally because you can drive on them; roads are
valuable because you can use them to get places and transport
goods.65 Thus, infrastructure resources are most valuable as means
for downstream uses rather than ends of themselves.66 Third, and
finally, “[t]he resource may be used as an input into a wide range of
goods and services, which may include private goods, public goods,
and social goods.”67 It is not “optimized for a particular user or use;”
instead, “[u]sers determine what to [do] with the capabilities that

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

FRISCHMANN, supra note 6.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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infrastructure provide[s].”68 And because some of the outputs of
infrastructure are public goods and social goods, industry is typically
undersupplied by markets or, if privately supplied, is focused on an
overly narrow set of uses.69
B.

Infrastructure For and Of Health Data

So what is infrastructure for health data? I use this term to
describe the set of resources that enable the collection, storage,
transmission, and use of health data. And indeed the term “health
data infrastructure” or “health information infrastructure” has
typically meant just this. Over twenty years ago, Larry Gostin, in an
article focused on health information privacy, defined “health
information infrastructure” as “the basic, underlying framework of
electronic information collection, storage, use, and transmission that
supports all of the essential functions of the health care system.”70
Health information infrastructure has been even more broadly
defined by a leading national committee as “the values, practices,
relationships, laws, standards, systems, applications, and
technologies that support all facets of individual health, health care,
and population health.”71 Thus, computer systems, data standards,
and communication protocols are included within such very broad
definitions of health infrastructure.72 What is not included, and is
described below, are the data themselves.
This concept of infrastructure for health data largely tracks
Frischmann’s characterization. These resources are largely
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. at 66.
70. Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 456 (1995)

(citing COMM. ON REG’L HEALTH DATA NETWORKS, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., HEALTH DATA IN THE
INFO. AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, & PRIVACY (Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr, eds.
1994); WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TOWARD A NAT’L HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE (1993); KAREN A. DUNCAN,
HEALTH INFO. & HEALTH REFORM: UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR A NAT’L HEALTH INFO.
SYSTEM (1994)). A decade earlier, a National Library of Medicine planning panel proposed
the idea of U.S. health infrastructure based on “a national computer network for use by the
entire biomedical community, both clinical and research professionals.” NAT’L LIBRARY OF
MED. PLANNING PANEL NO. 4: LONG RANGE PLAN ON MED. INFORMATICS (1986) (quoted in
Don E. Detmer, Building the National Health Information Infrastructure for Personal Health,
Health Care Services, Public Health, and Research, 3 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION
MAKING 3 (2003). See also JASON, A Robust Infrastructure Health Data Infrastructure, AGENCY
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (Nov. 2013), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/
default/files/ptp13-700hhs_white.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP8C-MRT8] (noting the history of
calls for health data infrastructure).
71. NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATS., INFO. FOR HEALTH: THE STRATEGY FOR
BUILDING THE NAT’L HEALTH INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2001); see also id. at 16 (elaborating
on this definition and describing the goals of the National Health Information
Infrastructure); see also JASON, supra note 70, at 1 (describing “a combination of electronic
health records (EHRs) and improved exchange of health information” as “health data
infrastructure”).
72. See also OECD, HEALTH INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 48, at 13 (not defining
health data infrastructure but focusing on electronic health records and ways to link and
connect them).
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nonrivalrous—they can be used by many simultaneously without
diminishing the benefits for others, and in fact increased use
increases their value as networks and as standards to promote
interoperability. In addition, their value lies not in their own use—
standards to encode health data or computer systems to store them
are not valuable on their own, but because of the primary and
secondary uses they enable for health data.73 And those uses are
many, including “clinical and prevention services, quality assurance,
financial reimbursement, monitoring of fraud and abuse, research,
and public health services.”74
As I have described above, however, we can also conceive of an
infrastructure of health data—that is, the view that the data
themselves are an infrastructural resource. But in fact, health data
also fit the characteristics of an infrastructural resource as laid out by
Frischmann.75 Health data are largely nonrivalrous, like other
information goods—my use of a set of treatment outcomes to
conduct innovative research does not interfere with your use of that
same set of treatment outcomes to measure the quality and efficiency
of the health care system.76 Health data are principally valuable for
their downstream uses—it may be interesting to know one’s
cholesterol levels, but those data are truly important for what users,
whether patients, doctors, or researchers, can do with them.77 And
finally, those downstream uses of health data are highly variable—
doctors can use health data to direct treatment for an individual
patient, researchers can use health data to develop new drugs or
treatments, and administrators can use health data to measure
system quality and develop incentives to improve that quality,
among many other possibilities.78

73. One could argue whether primary use of patient data by providers really qualifies
as “downstream” use of the health infrastructure. If not, then this set of resources merely
has a partially infrastructural quality, but the same arguments still apply, though possibly
with lesser force. As noted above, these resources are generally described as infrastructural
by scholars and policymakers.
74. Gostin, supra note 70, at 456.
75. For an application of Frischmann’s infrastructure model to big data more
generally, see OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROWTH & WELL-BEING
177–206 (2015) (hereinafter OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION).
76. See id. at 179–80 (describing big data as nonrivalrous).
77. See id. at 180–81 (describing big data as a capital good). As above, one could argue
that health data uses at the point of care—that is, primary uses—are not, in fact,
“downstream,” and that such value could be internalized at the point of care. Accepting
this argument would mean that health data only have some infrastructural characteristics,
instead of being fully infrastructural resources. The arguments about provision,
governance, and the like described below still hold, though their magnitude may be
decreased. Cf. id. at 63 (even though one can derive some consumption value from roads
from driving for fun, they create most of their value through downstream uses and are thus
infrastructural).
78. See id. at 181–83 (describing big data as a general-purpose input); Eisenberg &
Price, supra note 9, at 14–23 (describing several of the uses to which health data can be put
by one type of user, health insurers).
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Implications of an Infrastructure Model

What does an infrastructure model both for and of health data
imply? I draw three primary implications from applying an
infrastructure model: likely government involvement in provision,
relatively open access, and a preference for centralization.
1.

Government Involvement

Infrastructural resources are typically undersupplied by the
private sector.79 Because they are inputs into a broad set of uses that
include public and social goods, with typically substantial spillovers,
it is difficult for private actors to capture the full value of investing in
infrastructure.80 Accordingly, we expect private actors to invest at
suboptimal levels in infrastructure spending, suggesting a need for
some form of governmental investment or subsidy.81 The federal
government is an obvious choice as the largest payer for health care
and the entity with the possibility to break down state-by-state siloes
of data, and indeed the federal government already operates
substantial examples of health data infrastructure.82 With respect to
infrastructure for health data, the federal government has long been
involved in developing that infrastructure, including several
substantial panels and reports.83 Most recently, the federal
government committed billions of dollars in incentives in the
HITECH Act for the adoption of electronic health records, and
created corresponding penalties for failure to adopt them.84
Nevertheless, the government has also taken a lighter touch in some
areas of infrastructure for health data—it has forcefully stated the
case for interoperability, but declined to mandate the standards that
would make such interoperability more straightforward.85 As a
result, electronic health record formats are still frequently
79. FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14–15 (“society should expect underprovision of
[infrastructure] goods.”).
80. Id. In addition, because demand-side users of infrastructure are often unable to
capture the full value of public goods or social goods that they produce, demand for
infrastructure resources, as indicated purely by competitive markets, may also decrease the
supply of infrastructure resources. Id. at 72–78.
81. Id. at 14–15.
82. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 9, at 40; FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14 (noting
government provision of goods as a classic solution to infrastructure problems, alongside
government subsidies, community provision, and policies to allow private actors to charge
supramarginal costs). The federal government is not the only choice; states have the
primary role in regulating health, and might be another option. But state-by-state regimes
risk replicating fragmentation on a state level, and ERISA limits state abilities to regulate
the activities of some health actors such as many employer-funded health insurance plans.
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (holding a Vermont law requiring
insurers and providers to report claims data to a state-run database was preempted by
ERISA).
83. For a few of the more high-profile reports, see supra notes 70–72.
84. See supra note 8.
85. See ONC, INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP, supra note 44; ONC, 10-YEAR VISION, supra
note 44.
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incompatible, sometimes deliberately so, hampering the project of
infrastructure for health data.86
The federal government has also been involved in several
initiatives aimed—explicitly or not—at developing an infrastructure
of health data. These include the multi-site-but-connected Sentinel
Project (wherein FDA collects safety information on drugs in use),87
the Medicare and Medicaid systems, the Veterans Administration,88
and—specifically focused on forward-looking health research—the
Precision Medicine Initiative, aiming to collect comprehensive data
on at least one million Americans.89
An alternate model to direct federal investment could rely on
public-private partnerships, joining a central government authority
with nonprofit actors.90 There is no fundamental requirement that the
infrastructure provider be governmental or nonprofit; a for-profit
entity can provide public infrastructure given appropriate
incentives.91 But relying on private actors, even with incentives, can
reduce spillover benefits, as described in the next section. Overall, an
infrastructure model for and of health data suggests at least some role
for government involvement.
2.

Openness of Access

A second implication of an infrastructure model is that the
infrastructural resources might usefully be governed under a model
that permits relatively open access to the resource. As Frischmann
notes, infrastructure users frequently produce public goods and
social goods (in this case including downstream technical innovation
or information about system efficiency).92 Because they cannot
capture the social value of these goods, they are less willing to pay
for access to the infrastructural resource than is socially desirable.93
This creates demand problems, so that using a competitive market to
86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
87. See HEALTH AFFAIRS, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief, The FDA’s Sentinel

Initiative (June 4, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicy
brief_139.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9UM-M2GB]; Price, supra note 39, at 1441–42 (describing
the Sentinel project’s data implications); Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as Knowledge
Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, &
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds.) (forthcoming).
88. See Price, supra note 39, at 1440–41 (describing the Veterans Administration’s
data).
89. Id. at 1442–43; Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision
Medicine, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015).
90. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 14.
91. Examples include toll-road operators, power companies, and other public utilities.
See id. Of course, these monopolies raise their own concerns about potential rent-seeking
behavior.
92. Id. at 68–69.
93. Id. at 69. As Frischmann notes, although the classical approach to decreasing this
public goods problem is to subsidize the production of that public good, subsidizing the
production of the infrastructural input may also help. Id. at 71; see also supra Section III.C.1
(describing such government subsidization of infrastructure).
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regulate access to the infrastructural resource is likely to result in an
access regime that is tighter than socially optimal.94 Frischmann
suggests that a commons model, wherein access to the resource is
available on nondiscriminatory terms to members of the relevant
community—which may be the public at large—may be appropriate
for many infrastructure resources.95 For publicly managed
infrastructure, as I have suggested health data infrastructure is likely
to be and likely should be, Frischmann argues that commons
management is particularly appropriate because it creates a
“spillover-rich environment” by: (1) allowing users to decide how to
use the resource rather than picking beforehand which uses will be
prioritized, and (2) sustaining the generic, rather than specialized,
nature of the resource, which supports a broad range of potential
uses.96 For health data infrastructure, these reasons suggest that
making health data, and the infrastructural resources underlying
those data, broadly available for a wide range of uses is likely to
produce the greatest public benefit, whether to individual patient
care, systemic evaluation, innovation to produce new medical
products or new medical knowledge, or independent evaluations of
those innovations.97
To take a simplified example, imagine a health system
implementing a database for secondary use. One version it could
implement includes many health variables; another includes only
variables relevant to detecting insurance fraud. Potential users
include wealthy insurers and poor researchers. Insurers would likely
pay the same for either database; if the health system gauged what
system it should implement by market demand, and charged for
access, it would likely go with the simpler database. But that
database would be less socially valuable than a broader database that
could enable research use—and other potential downstream uses.
Keeping the resource generic, and keeping it broadly available,
increases the possibilities for social benefit. But that raises the
question of who will pay, which brings us back to the government
subsidy point made above.
Broad access to infrastructure for health data seems to raise
relatively few red flags, but broad access to infrastructure of health
data—that is, to the data themselves—raises the possibility of
substantial privacy concerns. As Roger Ford and I have previously
noted, the large amounts of health data useful for developing
94. FRISCHMANN, supra note 6, at 71.
95. Id. at 92–93. Frischmann notes that whether any particular infrastructure resource

should be managed as commons “remains[s an] incredibly difficult question[] that must be
answered contextually.” Id. at 93.
96. Id. at 94.
97. See, e.g., Price, supra note 39 (describing the possibility of using big health data to
develop sophisticated algorithms for use in health care); Ford & Price, supra note 53
(describing the possibility of independent evaluation of such algorithms).
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machine-learning-based algorithms in health care include sensitive
data for about which many worry.98 Addressing these concerns—or
at least considering them carefully and weighing their magnitude—is
an important aspect of health data infrastructure.99 At the very least,
addressing privacy concerns may increase the likelihood of voluntary
patient buy-in to the idea of broadly sharing health data.100
3.

Centralization

Finally, an infrastructure model raises the issue of centralization,
especially for an infrastructure of health data. At one end of the
spectrum, it could exist as a fully centralized health database, where
each patient has a single integrated patient record to which different
care providers or other entities add data. Alternately, health data
could reside in decentralized repositories, much like the current
system, but with increased connectivity between the repositories and
more rigorous standards that let data be meaningfully transferred
between and collated across repositories.101 This model is closest to
the current system—but that closeness demonstrates potential
problems, since even with federal initiatives to drive interoperability,
fragmentation persists.102 At the other end of the spectrum, a fully
decentralized system might have individual patients maintain their
own data, such as on a personal medical card that includes the entire
patient record.103 Such a system would similarly rely on meaningful
standards to ensure transportability and access of patient data by
different actors in the health care system.
Any of these systems might potentially work as infrastructure
for health data, to help enable care. However, a centralized system
likely carries a substantial benefit when considering health data as
infrastructure for later health innovation.104 Decentralized data are
98. Ford & Price, supra note 53; but see Carl F. Schneider, A Comment on Privacy and
Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(arguing these privacy concerns may be overblown).
99. See Gostin, supra note 70, at 485–89 (noting the need to consider health information
privacy within the context of infrastructure for health data); JASON, supra note 70, at 31–34
(focusing on privacy in infrastructure for health data).
100. See JASON, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing the need for patient trust). Of course,
some patients see little need for health data privacy, and willingly share their information
publicly. See, e.g., THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://personalgenomes.org
[https://perma.cc/MZ9W-SJY5] (last visited June 10, 2017) (creating a database for
individuals to publicly share their genomic and health data).
101. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 8, at 148–49 (describing federated databases and
their privacy benefits). The Sentinel system follows this model. Id.
102. See supra Section I.B.
103. See, e.g., Michael Chen & Adrian Gropper, Patient-Centered EHR Features and Demo,
(Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.hieofone.org [https://perma.cc/PV2Y-9X8W] (describing and
demoing the concept for an entirely patient-focused individual health record); Gostin, supra
note 70, at 461–63 (describing, in 1995, the potential storage of health data on electronic
health record cards).
104. I am certainly not the first to argue for a centralized health data system. See, e.g.,
Gostin, supra note 70, at 463–70 (discussing several limited health databases, federal and
otherwise, and discussing the possibility of a national data collection initiative). The claim
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fragmented along different dimensions—not necessarily among
different providers and actors in the health system, but between
different patients. However, many benefits of health data rely on
aggregating data from many patients, including precision medicine,
quality metrics, and efficiency measures. The risks for health
innovation described above include the problems of biases from
incomplete data and the risk of innovation being absent altogether.
Centralized health data ameliorate these risks by creating
comprehensive datasets for future analysis.
Centralization standing alone also raises concerns about limited
competition (if there is only one resource, there is no competition by
definition) and about limited access (if actors are shut out of the
single resource, where else can they turn?). These concerns are
lessened by the considerations suggested before of government
involvement and commons management. If a centralized health
database is government run or subsidized, competition is of limited
use—and, as noted, competition is often insufficient to adequately
drive the creation of infrastructural resources.105 Similarly, effective
commons management largely forecloses the problem of limited
access—again, reflecting the reality that market-driven demand for
infrastructural resources is often insufficient to reflect the social
benefits that come from their broad use.106
Centralization has complex effects on potential privacy risks. On
the one hand, centralization creates a broader picture of an
individual’s health—indeed, that’s the point—but that makes it easier
to derive more information about an already-identified individual,
and also potentially makes it easier to identify a de-identified
individual from a larger collection of data.107 A centralized system is
also a more attractive target for attacks and hacking attempts. On the
other hand, centralization, or just a coherent infrastructure, allows
some privacy-enhancing technologies to be deployed, such as oneway hashing.108 From a security standpoint, a centralized resource is
a more attractive target, but can also be the subject of substantially
of benefits from a federal system is ultimately an empirical claim, and would need to be
studied further before making policy decisions.
105. See supra Section III.C.1.
106. See supra Section III.C.2.
107. For instance, there may be many people in a particular health system that fit two
or three given characteristics; many fewer fit twenty or thirty, and two or three hundred
would be much more likely to apply only to a single individual. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (noting in the Fourth
Amendment context that collections of otherwise non-individualized characteristics can
identify an individual).
108. See, e.g., Ioana Danciu et al., Secondary Use of Clinical Data: The Vanderbilt Approach,
52 J. BIOMED. INFORMATICS 28 (2014) (discussing privacy-protecting practices to store and
collect data at Vanderbilt); Abel N. Kho et al., Design and Implementation of a Privacy
Preserving Electronic Health Record Linkage Tool in Chicago, 22 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N. 1072–80 (2015) (discussing similar practices in Chicago); Ford & Price, supra note 53,
at 36–37 (discussing protecting health data privacy through technological measures
generally).
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more security given the possible concentration of resources at a single
location. Overall, the case for centralization is not ironclad, but the
increased benefits make it strongly worth considering.
CONCLUSION
The health system relies on data, but collects and maintains
those data in a haphazard, fragmented, and insecure way that creates
real risks for patients and for the system as a whole. Given market
incentives driving competition among different data systems and
health actors, health data seem likely to remain fragmented without
broader systemic action. Conceiving of infrastructure both for and of
health data suggests that standardized, centralized collection and
maintenance of health data, subsidized and managed as a commons,
may create substantial goods at both the individual and systemic
level. If we are to realize the goal of data-informed patient care and
data-driven development of future medical technology, an
infrastructure both for and of health data provides a step in the right
direction.

